When a Georgia Land Owner Fails to Keep People Safe: Proving Prior Crimes
I have been writing a series of Georgia negligent security law posts, talking about when a Georgia property owner might be liable in, say, a Savannah hotel rape lawsuit, or a Marietta restaurant parking lot assault lawsuit. Yesterday I began discussing how a victim would go about proving that the landlord could "foresee" the crime - which is what Georgia law requires in order to hold a property owner or property manager liable for failing to keep people safe on the property. I talked about a common misconception among lawyers - the notion that a plaintiff must prove other similar incidents occurred in order to hold the premises owner liable.
In fact, under Georgia law, the plaintiff does not have to show that other similar incidents, such as other rapes or assaults or shootings, occurred. In practical terms, the lawyer often does offer evidence of other prior attacks. For example, a lawyer representing a Decatur apartment rape victim may want to introduce evidence that other assaults or violent attacks occurred at or at least near the apartment complex; an attorney representing the victim of a violent attack at an Atlanta hotel may choose to offer evidence that other hotel guests had been attacked.
Today I want to talk about what constitutes a "similar incident" that a plaintiff may show in order to prove that the defendant should have foreseen a criminal attack. According to Georgia's law, the incident causing the plaintiff's injury "must be substantially similar in type to the previous criminal activities on or near the premises so that a reasonable person would take ordinary precautions to protect his invitees against the risks posed by that type of activity." McNeal v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 230 Ga.App. 786, 498 S.E.2d 294, 98 FCDR 1084, cert. denied (1998) (emphasis in original).
The courts have been very clear that substantially similar does not mean identical. "In determining whether a prior criminal act is substantially similar, we note that 'substantially similar does not mean identical.'" Shoney's Inc. v. Hudson, 218 Ga.App. 171, 460 S.E.2d 809 (1995) (emphasis added). For example, it does not matter "whether a weapon was used"; the question is "whether the prior crimes should have put an ordinarily prudent person on notice that the [invitees] were facing increased risks." Id. The incident only has to "be sufficient to attract the [proprietor's] attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated incident.' (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Matt [v. Days Inns of America, Inc.], 212 Ga.App. at 794, 443 S.E.2d 290." Shoney's Inc. v. Hudson, 218 Ga.App. 171, 460 S.E.2d 809 (1995) (emphasis added). See also Sturbridge Partners v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785, 786, 482 S.E.2d 339 (1997); Wade v. Findlay Management, Inc., 253 Ga.App. 688, 560 S.E.2d 283 (2002); Agnes Scott College v. Clark, 273 Ga. App. 619, 616 S.E.2d 468 (2005), cert. denied (2005); Confetti Atlanta, Ltd. v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991), cert. denied (1992); Bayshore Company v. Pruitt, 175 Ga.App. 679, 334 S.E.2d 213, cert. denied (1985); Baker v. Simon Property Group, Inc., 273 Ga.App. 406, 614 S.E.2d 793 (2005).
Thus, an attorney representing a Duluth parking lot shooting victim probably will want to show that other violent or potentially violent crimes - such as robberies, shootings, home burglaries -- occurred on or near the property. The victim will not have to offer evidence that other people were shot in that very parking lot, however.




